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THE EMPLOYER'S INDEMNITY ACTION
Masters are liable to third persons for the torts of their servants
acting within the scope of their employment.' However, the master
has an action in indemnity against the tortious servant for losses paid
to third parties, provided the master is without fault.' In the past,
employers have rarely brought such actions against their negligent
workers.' Possible reasons for this reluctance include the adverse ef-
fect on employee morale, the inability of the employee to satisfy the
judgment, and the opposition of labor unions.4 However, the em-
ployer's widespread use of liability insurance and the provision for
insurer subrogation in such policies have encouraged the use of in-
demnity actions by the insurer-subrogee and have provided legal
complications for the employer-employee relationship.
The Origin and Rationale of the Indemnity Action
Although early American common law cases did not use the term
"indemnity," the master was allowed to recover against the tortious
servant for the full amount of a third party claim.5 Subsequently, the
right of indemnity was formally recognized in Oceanic Steam Naviga-
tion Co. v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola' where it was
reasoned:
[O]ne who has been held legally liable for the personal neg-
lect of another is entitled to indemnity from the latter no matter
whether contractual relations existed between them or not ....
The right to indemnity stands upon the principle that everyone
is responsible for his own negligence, and if another person has
been compelled . . . to pay damages which ought to have been
1. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2320; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957).
2. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 96 (1937); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 401, comment (d) at 239 (1957); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 51, at 311 (4th ed. 1971).
3. James, Indemnity, Subrogation, and Contribution and the Efficient Distribution
of Accident Losses, 21 NACCA L.J. 360 (1958).
4. Note, 63 YALE L.J. 570 (1954).
5. Smith v. Foran, 43 Conn. 244 (1875) (common carrier granted an action in case to
recover damages paid to a patron as a result of the servant's negligent smoking while
transporting a piano); Grand Truck Ry. Co. v. Latham, 63 Me. 177 (1874) (railroad
allowed an action in assumpsit to recover punitive damages paid as a result of the serv-
ant's severe insult to passenger).
6. 134 N.Y. 461, 31 N.E. 987 (1892).
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paid by the wrongdoer, they may be recovered from him.'
(Emphasis added.)
The British approach rests on a different ground. In Lister v.
Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co., Ltd.,' the House of Lords held
that a "lorry" driver must indemnify his employer for damages paid
to an injured pedestrian.' The court found an implied obligation in
the employment contract that the servant would perform his duties
with reasonable skill and care."' Thus, the master would have a right
of action against his servant for breach of his employment contract
when the master was forced to pay for a loss as a result of the serv-
ant's negligence.
Although it is settled that the British indemnity action rests
upon an implied term of contract, the basis of the American action
is, unfortunately, not so clear. Several American common law juris-
dictions have adopted the British approach and rested the master's
right upon implied contract." Other courts have offered unjust en-
richment as its foundation because the employee has been unduly
benefited by the master's payment to the injured third party. Still
another theory is that the action's basis is tort because the servant
has also committed a wrong against the master. 3 This conflict be-
comes more than merely academic when one considers that the pre-
scriptive period will vary depending upon which theory is adopted by
7. Id. at 467-68, 31 N.E. at 989.
8. [19571 A.C. 555 (1956).
9. In the original action, the trial court found the injured party one-third at fault and
reduced the award accordingly under the British system of comparative negligence. In the
indemnity action the defendant was required to pay this reduced sum with costs.
10. Lister v. Romford Ice & Cold Stor. Co., Ltd., [1957] A.C. 555 (1956).
11. McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Beige, 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463 (1952);
Gadsden v. George H. Crafts & Co., 175 N.C. 358, 95 S.E. 610 (1918); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co.
v. Capolino, 65 N.E.2d 287 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945).
12. Gilman v. United States, 206 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1953); Oceanic Steam Navig. Co.
v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola, 134 N.Y. 461, 31 N.E. 987 (1892). But see Schubert
v. August Schubert Wag. Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928) (It was stated in dictum
that indemnity would be allowed an employer for payment of a tort judgment to the
employee's wife regardless of the husband-wife immunity in tort suits.); Koontz v. Messer,
320 Pa. 487, 181 A. 792 (1935) (An employer was granted indemnity for a judgment paid
to the negligent employee's wife despite the employee's immunity from suit by his wife.).
13. This writer has not uncovered an American case which based the indemnity
action on tort. However, in Romford Ice & Cold Stor. Co. v. Lister, [1955-3] All E.R. 460,
464 (C.A.), a dissenting opinion stated that the action was founded upon the servant's
wrong against the master and not implied contract. One majority opinion suggested this
as an alternative basis.
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the court." Since the master-servant relationship arises out of con-
tract,'5 either express or implied, and the liability of the master for
injuries caused by the servant to third parties is derived from this
relationship, it would seem that the master's right to indemnity
should also be based upon contract.
As a general rule, joint tortfeasors have no right to indemnity.' 6
The basis of this rule rests on public policy, in that no one should be
able to "claim an advantage for his own wrong."" Thus, if a master
is concurrently liable with the servant for the wrong committed, an
action for indemnity will not lie.'" However, there is no reason to bar
indemnification when the master is held liable solely by imputation
of law " since he has committed no wrong.
20
Effect of the Original Suit Against the Master
The "New York" rule provides that a judgment against an em-
ployer in the original suit is conclusive evidence of the employee's
negligence. However, the employee must be "vouched in", i.e., noti-
14. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Capolino, 65 N.E.2d 287 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945). The failure
of an employee to act with reasonable care in performing his duties was a breach of an
implied condition of the employment contract, and thus subject to the six-year statute of
limitations rather than the two-year tort statute.
15. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Soileau, 167 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1948); Hudson v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 169 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964); Texas Co. v. Jackson, 174 Miss.
737, 165 So. 546 (1936); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Capolino, 65 N.E.2d 287 (Ohio Ct. App.
1945); Davis v. Fire Creek Fuel Co., 144 W. Va. 537, 109 S.E.2d 144 (1959).
16. Penn v. Inferno Mfg. Corp., 199 So. 2d 210 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Hebert v.
Blankenship, 187 So. 2d 798 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966); Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Hardware Mut.
Cas. Co., 186 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966). See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS § 50,
at 305 (4th ed. 1971).
17. Appalachian Corp. v. Brooklyn Coop. Co., 151 La. 41, 46, 91 So. 539, 541 (1922).
18. However, the master would still have an action against the servant for contribu-
tion of the servant's pro rata share of the damage.
19. Yuba Consol. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 338 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1964); Ecuyer v.
Benevolent Ass'n of Elks, 152 La. 73, 92 So. 739 (1922); Sutton v. Champagne, 141 La.
469, 75 So. 209 (1917); Am. Employers' Ins. Co. v. Gulf States Util. Co., 4 So. 2d 628 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1941). See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS § 51, at 311 (4th ed. 1971).
20. This principle was illustrated in McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge, 304 N.Y.
314, 107 N.E.2d 463 (1952), in which the court stated: "Where several tortfeasors are
involved .. .indemnity arises in favor of the wrongdoer who has been guilty of passive
negligence . ..against the one who has been actively negligent. The actively negligent
tortfeasor is considered the primary or principle wrongdoer and held responsible for his
negligent act not only to the person directly injured thereby, but also to any other person
indirectly harmed by being cast in damages by operation of law for the wrongful act."
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fled of the original action and given an opportunity to defend against
the third party's allegations of negligence."1
Other jurisdictions employ a more lenient rule;22 even if notice
is given, the judgment finding negligence in the original suit is not
conclusive, but is given significant weight in the indemnity action. 3
The burden is then on the employee to show that either he was not
negligent, or that the master was at fault.24
Effect of Settlement-Extent of Employee's Liability
In most jurisdictions, the master's right to indemnification is not
prejudiced when he compromises the action rather than contests lia-
bility.2" In that situation, however, the issue of the servant's negli-
gence would be litigated in the indemnity action. 1 In relation to
settlement between the servant and the third party, this compromise
inures to the benefit of the master so as to release him from further
liability.27 It is reasoned that the plaintiff has only one cause of action
which is extinguished by settlement with the employee. Any attempt
by the third party to reserve rights against the master will be disre-
garded by the court, for such a reservation would ultimately place
liability upon the servant. This result would be inequitable, since the
servant has already repaired his wrong.28
The employee is liable to his employer for only the actual dam-
21. Fedden v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Term., 204 App. Div. 741, 199 N.Y.S. 9 (1923);
accord, Buhl v. Viera, 328 Mass. 201, 102 N.E.2d 774 (1952).
22. It is difficult to determine which is the majority view since there are few cases
dealing with this issue.
23. In Costa v. Yoachim, 104 La. 170, 172, 28 So. 992, 993 (1900), it was stated that:
"IT]he judgment in question was not conclusive evidence of negligence, it was evidence
to which it was proper to give some weight. When a judgment . . . is not attacked as
fraudulent, and no error is made to appear, it is binding on the employ6 who was notified,
who was a witness, and whose negligence was the only cause of damage which was found
against the employer. . . . It devolved upon the employ6. The onus was with him to show
the judgment was in any particular erroneous." (Emphasis added.)
24. Cf. Gillingham v. Charleston Tow-boat & Transp. Co., 40 F. 649 (D.S.C. 1889)
(Prior judgment against the master did not estop the servant from denying his liability,
but constituted a prima facie case for the master.).
25. Smith v. Foran, 43 Conn. 244 (1875). The employer was a common carrier and
liable for the third party's damage regardless of any wrongful act committed by the
employee.
26. Id. at 245; Grannan, Patterson, and Holliday v. Hoel, 15 La. Ann. 308 (1860).
27. Williams v. Marionneax, 240 La. 713, 124 So. 2d 919 (1960); Caldwell v. Montgo-
mery Ward, 271 So. 2d 363 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972); Smith v. South & W. Ry. Co., 151
N.C. 479, 66 S.E. 435 (1909).
28. Williams v. Marionneax, 240 La. 713, 124 So. 2d 919 (1960).
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age sustained by the third party.29 Thus, when the employer has
settled the claim for more than the actual damage, he can only re-
cover the amount of the actual damage. Similarly, if the employer
has paid less than the actual damage he can recover only the amount
paid to the third party." However, where the original cause of action
has been litigated rather than settled, the employee's liability may
be expanded to include the employer's court costs and attorney's
fees."
Recognition and Application of the Indemnity Action in Louisiana
Although the Louisiana Civil Code specifically states that mas-
ters are liable for the torts of their servants," no provision is made
for indemnification." However, indemnity has been recognized juris-
prudentially since the 1860 case of Brannan, Patterson, and Holliday
v. Hoe 34 where steamboat owners were allowed to recover from their
pilot amounts paid to another boat owner as a result of a collision
occasioned by the pilot and other officers' negligence. In holding that
recovery was not precluded by the fact that others besides the defen-
dant were culpable for the wrongful act, the court, by implication,
recognized the right of indemnity in Louisiana.
Forty years later, the question of indemnity arose again in Costa
v. Yoachim.Y The court, drawing from early English jurisprudence,36
permitted a wagon owner to recover from his negligent driver the
amount of a judgment paid to a third party. The Costa decision is
the first clearly expressed acknowledgement of the employer's right
to indemnity by the Louisiana supreme court."
29. Smith v. Foran, 43 Conn. 244 (1875); RESTATEMENT OF RESTrruTION § 96 (1937);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 401, comment (d) at 239 (1957).
30. Id.
31. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Latham, 63 Me. 177 (1874); Fireman's Fund Am. Ins.
Co. v. Turner, 260 Ore. 30, 488 P.2d 429 (1971).
32. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2320.
33. See Comment, 44 TuL. L. REv. 119, 156 (1970) (offering a suggested draft of a code
article which provides indemnity for persons held vicariously liable for the torts of others).
34. 15 La. Ann. 308 (1860).
35. 104 La. 170, 28 So. 992 (1900).
36. Id. at 173, 28 So. at 993: " 'While the master is liable to third persons for injury
arising from his servant's negligence within the scope of his employement, if the master
is free from fault as to the negligence in question he may have his remedy against his
servant for damages to which he is thereby subjected .... '" The source of the quotation
was cited incorrectly by the court and is therefore unavailable.
37. In Rumpf v. Cao, 132 So. 763 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1931), the indemnity action
was recognized in dictum. Upon dismissal of the employer as co-defendant, the negligent
employee objected. The court stated that if liability could be placed on the employer, he
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The most recent litigation involving indemnity to reach the su-
preme court is the case of Williams v. Marionneaux" The court
stated that the master whose liability rests on respondeat superior is




In Louisiana, the judgment in the original tort action is not con-
sidered conclusive but only evidence of the servant's liability to his
employer." Also, the master may compromise with the third party
without prejudicing his right against the servant.2 Similarly, settle-
ment by the servant with the third party will operate to release the
master regardless of any reservation of rights by the third party."
Although not previously litigated it would seem reasonable that
the Louisiana courts would follow common law jurisdictions in situa-
tions where the master settles with the third party and consider the
servant liable only for the actual damage sustained or the amount
paid by the master, whichever is lower." If there is no settlement, the
courts would likely hold the servant liable for the costs of the original
action since such costs result from the servant's conduct.'5
It should be noted that the Louisiana courts have yet to decide
whether the employer's indemnity action is based upon implied con-
tract, unjust enrichment, or tort." Therefore, it is still an open ques-
tion as to which prescriptive rules are applicable to the master. 7
could maintain an action to recover any amount paid to the injured party, but the em-
ployee could not recover from the employer amounts that he was required to pay.
38. 240 La. 713, 124 So. 2d 919 (1960).
39. In Little v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 177 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1965), it was held that since the master and servant are not joint tortfeasors, they are not
bound in solido. Therefore, suit against the servant will not interrupt prescription as to
the master; accord, Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303 (La. 1973).
40. The Hoel and Costa cases were cited as authority for the master's right to indemn-
ity.
41. Costa v. Yoachim, 104 La. 170, 28 So. 992 (1900).
42. Brannan, Patterson, and Holliday v. Hoel, 15 La. Ann. 308 (1860).
43. Williams v. Marionneax, 240 La. 713, 124 So. 2d 919 (1960).
44. See notes 29-30 and accompanying text supra.
45. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
46. See notes 14-16 and accompanying text supra. An action for unjust enrichment
is provided for in Louisiana under Civil Code article 1965 or the civil law action de in rem
verso. Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc., 251 La. 624, 205 So. 2d 422 (1968).
47. Civil Code article 3536 provides a one-year prescriptive period on tort actions




The Basis for Respondeat Superior and the Indemnity Action-An
Apparent Conflict
It has been stated that the master's vicarious liability is simply
a means of providing the injured party with a "deep pocket" in cases
where the servant wrongdoer is financially unable to answer for the
consequences of his acts." But, in relation to moral considerations,
rather than those of economics, liability is imposed upon one "not at
fault" because the injury is a by-product of an activity which benefits
the employer."
The right of indemnity rests on the proposition that the servant
is solely at fault, whereas the master's liability is merely derivative.",
However, indemnity is clearly inconsistent with modern practices of
risk distribution. Today, an employer commonly insures himself
against the foreseeable risks involved in maintaining a work force and
spreads the cost among the purchasers of his goods and services.'
Indemnity takes losses out of the channels of distribution and places
them back upon the individual employee. The indemnity rule seems
particularly harsh when one considers that in the original action the
jury makes its decision under an assumption that the loss would be
borne by insurance."
One argument for the indemnity right is that it serves as a deter-
rent to employee negligence . 3 Although potential liability may have
a deterrent effect with regard to gross negligence or intentional tortsj
it does not seem that a possible money judgment could reduce the
inadvertant errors of employees.55 Our country's experience with
workmen's compensation has established that the way to reduce in-
dustrial injuries is to put the principal sanction on the employer.
5 6
48. T. BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 154 (1916).
49. James, Indemnity, Subrogation, and Contribution and the Efficient Distribution
of Accident Losses, 21 NACCA L.J. 360 (1958).
50. Steffan, The Employer's "Indemnity" Action, 25 U. CI. L. REv. 465 (1958).
51. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Turner, 260 Ore. 30, 488 P.2d 429 (1971); Note,
63 YALE L.J. 570 (1954).
52. James, Indemnity, Subrogation, and Contribution and the Efficient Distribution
of Accident Losses, 21 NACCA L.J. 360 (1958).
53. Lister v. Romford Ice & Cold Stor. Co., Ltd., [1957] A.C. 555 (1956).
54. United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954). It was held that the Federal Tort
Claims Act did not provide the government a right of indemnity for the negligent acts of
their employees. But see Gahagan v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 233 F. Supp. 171
(W.D. La. 1964) (The United States was allowed to recover from the employee's insurer
as a "person or organization" legally responsible under the terms of the policy.).
55. See Note, 63 YALE L.J. 570 (1954).
56. A. REEDE, ADEQUACY OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 324 (1947).
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He, rather than the employee, can take more effective steps to reduce
accidents."
Insurer Subrogation-the Real Problem
Despite its inequities, the master's right of indemnity is strongly
entrenched in American and British jurisprudence. Although the wise
employer has exercised his right infrequently," the employer's insurer
holding the right of indemnity through subrogation, is not hampered
by such considerations as employee morale. Subrogation provides for
inequities to the employer and ultimately to consumers who bear the
cost of insurance. As the insured, the employer pays premiums to
protect against the risk of his servants causing harm to third persons.
With subrogation rights, however, the actual coverage afforded the
employer is decreased to the extent that the insurer recovers from the
employee.
Recently, the Oregon supreme court rejected an opportunity to
overrule the indemnity action.59 The court acknowledged merit in the
defendant's contention that considerations of public policy were more
important than an outdated rule of law exercised without regard to
its results. However, the court also recognized that there were no
cases where the indemnity rule had been judicially abolished and
therefore the primary responsibility for change must be legislative.
With legislative action doubtful,"0 it seems that employers and
employees must take measures to prevent the use of subrogation by
insurers. One suggestion has been to insure the master and servant
under the same policy 1 thereby defeating the subrogation rights of
the insurer."2 There should be little or no increase in the employer's
premium since it need only cover the loss of the insurer's right to
recover from the servant. 3 Another remedy would be a provision in
collective bargaining agreements excluding any indemnity right
57. Steffen, The Employer's "Indemnity" Action, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 465 (1958).
58. Note, 63 YALE L.J. 570 (1954) (research indicates only six reported cases in the
twentieth century).
59. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Turner, 260 Ore. 30, 488 P.2d 429 (1971).
60. Id. at 36, 488 P.2d at 432: "[Ljegislation which undertakes to relieve persons
from responsibility for their wrongful acts is usually subject to strong criticism. (Witness
the current controversy over proposals for 'no fault' insurance legislation.)"
61. Jolowicz, The Right to Indemnity Between Master and Servant, 1956 CAMB. L.J.
101.
62. Crowson v. Bridges, 227 Miss. 73, 85 So. 2d 810 (1956); cf. Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Employer's Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis., 208 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953).
63. Jolowicz, The Right to Indemnity Between Master and Servant, 1956 CAMB. L.J.
[Vol. 34
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against the employees for their acts of ordinary negligence. " Although
the validity of such provisions has never been at issue, they would not
appear to violate public policy."
Conclusion
The master's right of indemnity for the servant's acts of ordinary
negligence is an outmoded and illogical rule of law given our present
industrial environment. Neither the British nor the American deci-
sions offer any strong rational basis for supporting the indemnity
action. Following the former approach, an employee, upon entering
employment, would contract never to make a mistake. To imply such
an intention on the part of employees appears contrary to reality. A
right of indemnity based on simple equity i.e., liability upon the
wrongdoer, is just as irrational in its result. In general, the indemnity
action tends to subvert both the policy behind respondeat superior
and the effectiveness of modern risk distribution. A better policy
would be to limit the right of indemnity to servants' acts of gross
negligence or intentional injury.
John C. Folkenroth
64. James, Indemnity, Subrogation, and Contribution and the Efficient Distribution
of Accident Losses, 21 NACCA L.J. 360 (1958). A subrogee obtains no greater rights than
those of his subrogor. Therefore, since the employer has contracted away his right to
indemnity, the insurer would have no action against the employee.
65. Id.
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